ESSAY
ETHICAL SURVEILLANCE IN VACCINE PASSPORTS
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ABSTRACT
This Essay explores the interrelated privacy and equality risks
of deploying surveillance technology used in COVID-19 vaccine
passports. The type of vaccine passport that governments implement
has significant human rights ramifications. This Essay discusses how
different vaccine passport designs can curb or exacerbate risks,
providing a roadmap to guide policymakers in their app selection to
mitigate unintended consequences. Vaccine passports should work
on a decentralized system and use the least invasive data possible.
Further, vaccine passports should be based solely on government
vaccine data, be implemented only in places where vaccines are
widely available for free, track location only when they are scanned,
and provide a non-digital option. Governments should have clear
sunset clauses for the app and the data collected.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Essay explores the ethics of immunity passports’
surveillance and, in particular, the risk these passports pose for
magnifying existing inequalities. A balancing assessment
underpins the analysis, purposed with contributing to legal
research and guiding policymakers, judges, employers, and
individuals tasked with making difficult containment choices.
Vaccine passports attest to the bearer’s inoculation against
COVID-19 and to the type of vaccine the person received. These
digital immunity passports can be designed narrowly, to verify
only vaccination status, or more broadly, to include other
information such as recent testing and recovery. Vaccine passports
help tailor COVID-19-related restrictions to part of the population,
such as allowing only those holding a passport to travel or engage
in leisure activities.
Vaccine passports are breaking new ground. While vaccine
attestations have existed for centuries, this is the first time that the
world addresses a pandemic by deploying surveillance technology
to contain its spread.1 Immunity passports will continue to be
relevant as long as any fraction of the population refuses COVID-

1. As a qualifier, governments used digital technology to some extent (although a
much lower extent) for tracing during the 2009 swine flu health crisis. See Laura Dyrda,
From Swine Flu to the Coronavirus: How Tech Is Helping Flatten the Curve This Time Around,
BECKER’S HEALTH (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.beckershospitalreview.com/healthcareinformation-technology/from-swine-flu-to-the-coronavirus-how-tech-helps-to-flattenthe-curve-this-time-around.html [https://perma.cc/9CNU-82QD]. For an early example of
immunity passports, see Lawrence Alexander Sawchuk & Lianne Tripp, Managing an
Epidemic in Imperfect Times: Encampment and Immunity Passes in 19th Century Gibraltar, 6
BMJ GLOBAL HEALTH (2021).
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19 vaccines,2 given the importance of widespread vaccination for
virus containment and the disparate rates of hospitalization
between vaccinated and unvaccinated individuals.3 As Omicron
has demonstrated, even relatively small percentages of
unvaccinated people can disproportionately affect, and ultimately
overwhelm healthcare systems. Contemporary policy decisions
made about vaccine passports may lead to path dependency for
future health crises and have consequences for generations in
terms of health policy, human rights, surveillance, and inequality.
All types of surveillance come with risks. Governments should
be cognizant that the material benefits associated with vaccine
passports are accompanied by drawbacks and limitations.
Governments should mitigate those drawbacks in their choices and
design of vaccine passports. Most research published on immunity
passports thus far has been from a scientific perspective, leaving a
rich discussion on their ethics to be explored.
Decision-makers must clearly identify and limit these
drawbacks when making implementation decisions to enable
effective policy responses to the current health crisis. This
approach can assist governments in developing containment
policies that are widely accepted,4 while minimally encroaching on
human rights.
II. THREE DISTINCTIONS AMONG IMMUNITY PASSPORTS
A.

Scope

Immunity passports offer data-based assessments of COVID19 immunity status. They aim to identify those with immunity to
allow countries to (relatively) safely open the economy,5 allowing

2. See Ana Santos Rutschman & Timothy Wiemken, Vaccine Hesitancy:
Experimentalism as Regulatory Opportunity, 4 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 227
(2020).
3. Washington State Department of Health, COVID-19 Cases, Hospitalizations, and
Deaths
by
Vaccination
Status
5-6
(Feb
2,
2022),
https://www.doh.wa.gov/Portals/1/Documents/1600/coronavirus/data-tables/421010-CasesInNotFullyVaccinated.pdf [https://perma.cc/M2MJ-EQ3P].
4. See Sebastian Guidi et. al., Depolarizing the COVID-19 Vaccine Passport, YALE L. J.
FORUM (forthcoming 2022).
5. Aaron Schwid & Tom Frieden, How to Reopen the Economy Safely? Immunity
POST
(Dec.
21,
2020),
Passports,
WASH.
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those certified as immune to engage in more activities than those
who are not. Such data-based assessments mean that immunity
passports can collect and aggregate information about immunity
from health databases. The passports can be distinguished in three
ways: what they are used for, how they store the data, and what
data they collect.
There are two contexts for using immunity passports:
domestic and international.6 Most passports for vaccine
certification are designed to be used domestically, shown to
businesses or other parties as a condition for admission, and
usually cross-reference the app with patient data in government
records.7 Some examples of domestic immunity passports are
Denmark’s CoronaPass,8 Brunei’s BruHealth,9 Saudi Arabia’s
Tawakkalna,10 Quebec’s VaxiCode,11 and Israel’s recently canceled
Green Pass.12 The second type of apps are designed to certify
passengers’ vaccination status for international travel. Examples

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/12/21/tom-frieden-covid-immunitypassports/ [https://perma.cc/WE8X-XYF5].
6. See, e.g., Department of Health and Social Care, Using Your NHS COVID Pass for
Travel Abroad and at Venues and Settings in England, GOV.UK (May 7, 2021)
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/nhs-covid-pass.
7. Karen Weintraub & Elizabeth Weise, New York Launches Nation’s First ‘Vaccine
Passports.’ Others Are Working on Similar Ideas, But Many Details Must Be Worked Out, USA
TODAY
(Apr.
1,
2021),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/health/2021/03/26/covid-vaccine-passportsnew-york-first-vaccination-proof-system/6976009002/ [https://perma.cc/HB2Z-8PRF].
8. Protecting Lives and Livelihoods, CORONAPASS, https://www.coronapass.org/home
[https://perma.cc/7JN4-N9QB].
OF
HEALTH
BRUNEI
DARUSSALAM,
9. BruHealth,
MINISTRY
https://www.moh.gov.bn/SitePages/bruhealth.aspx
[https://perma.cc/A3BQ-7FWV]
(last visited Jan. 26, 2022); Shareen Han, Gov’t Rolls Out BruHealth Contact Tracing App as
Restrictions Loosened, SCOOP (May 14, 2020), https://thescoop.co/2020/05/14/govtlaunches-bruhealth-contact-tracing-app/ [https://perma.cc/5SND-KKPH].
10. Tuqa Khalid, Coronavirus: How to Use Saudi Arabia’s ‘Tawakkalna’ App to Get
NEWS
(May
26,
2020),
Movement
Permits,
ALARABIYA
https://english.alarabiya.net/coronavirus/2020/05/26/Coronavirus-How-to-use-SaudiArabia-s-Tawakkalna-app-to-get-movement-permits [https://perma.cc/89MD-C3P5].
QUÉBEC,
11. COVID-19
Vaccination
Passport,
SANTÉ
https://www.quebec.ca/en/health/health-issues/a-z/2019-coronavirus/progress-ofthe-covid-19-vaccination/covid-19-vaccination-passport [https://perma.cc/SW4J-3QHG]
(last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
12. Finance Minister Calls for Cancellation of COVID ‘Green Pass’, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Jan.
18, 2022), https://www.timesofisrael.com/liveblog_entry/finance-minister-calls-forcancellation-of-covid-vaccine-green-pass/ [https://perma.cc/3GBY-UBPS].
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include Malaysia’s Immunitee Health Passport,13 Singapore’s
SafeEntry and TraceTogether,14 the EU Digital Covid Certificate
(used for travel among member states),15 and the International Air
Transport Association’s Travel Pass.16
B.

Data Treatment

These apps can also be distinguished by their data storage
models. Centralized immunity passports store all reference data in
one database, which is made accessible through an app.
Decentralized passports authenticate data without storing it
centrally, often encrypting it. If someone with a decentralized
immunity passport goes to a vaccination site, the site generates a
code to represent a proof of vaccination. That code can then be
stored and encrypted so that, when the person boards a plane, the
airline can verify the code’s authenticity without accessing other
data.17

13. Roy Chiang, Malaysia’s First Health Passport, Immunitee Formally Accepted in
HEALTH
NEWS
(Mar.
1,
2021),
Singapore,
MOBI
https://www.mobihealthnews.com/news/asia/malaysia-s-first-health-passportimmunitee-formally-acceptedsingapore#:~:text=In%20collaboration%20with%20Affinidi%2C%20a,Affinidi's%20Uni
fier%20digital%20credential%20platform [https://perma.cc/PAH5-49PR].
14. Hariz Baharudin, Nearly All in Singapore Are on COVID-19 Contact Tracing
TIMES
(Jan.
20,
2022),
Programme
TraceTogether,
STRAITS
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/nearly-all-in-singapore-are-on-covid19-contact-tracing-programme-tracetogether [https://perma.cc/6QZH-33S3]; Tham
Yuen-C, Police Can Use TraceTogether Data for Criminal Investigations, STRAITS TIMES (Jan.
5,
2021),
https://www.straitstimes.com/singapore/politics/police-can-usetracetogether-data-for-criminal-investigations-0
[https://perma.cc/7SGP-WZZV];
Vaccinated Status for Travel to Singapore, IMMIGRATION CHECKPOINTS AUTHORITY SINGAPORE,
https://safetravel.ica.gov.sg/health/vtsg (last visited Mar. 2, 2022).
15. The E.U.’s Digital COVID Certificate Is Now Live but What Is It and Which Countries
(Feb.
1,
2021),
Are
Accepting
It?,
EURONEWS
https://www.euronews.com/travel/2021/07/01/digital-covid-certificate-eu-widetravel-pass-officially-comes-into-force [https://perma.cc/2WGM-QYM4].
16. Justin Meneguzzi, Will You Need An ‘Immunity Passport’ To Travel?, BBC (Aug. 31,
2020), https://www.bbc.com/travel/article/20200831-coronavirus-will-you-need-animmunity-passport-to-travel [https://perma.cc/7JJB-A7UF]; IATA Travel Pass Initiative,
IATA
https://www.iata.org/en/programs/passenger/travel-pass/
[https://perma.cc/FKZ7-JRLA] (last visited Jan. 26, 2022).
17. Laura Ricci et al., Blockchains for Covid-19 Contact Tracing and Vaccine Support:
A Systematic Review, 9 IEEE ACCESS 37936, 37944 (2021); Wei Yan Ng et al., Blockchain
Applications in Health Care for COVID-19 and Beyond: A Systematic Review, 3 THE LANCET
DIGITAL HEALTH 819, 824 (2021).
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Many immunity passports are encrypted end-to-end,
whereby only the communicating users can access the messages,
while others have been criticized for their lack of encryption.18
Most passports use a QR code, and in some of them the code
changes at regular intervals to keep the information updated. Some
store this data in the Blockchain,19 a system of recording
information that makes it difficult or impossible to change the
record, and that allows users to share information on their
immunity status through the app.
Besides the question of how data are stored, what data are
stored is also relevant. Some immunity passports continuously
track users’ location through GPS, which is unnecessary for their
certification function, while others do not. For example, Saudi
Arabia’s Tawakkalna app requires a constant GPS connection to
function,20 whereas the EU Digital Covid Certificate does not
connect to GPS, and even has an option to be printed—making it
impossible to track user’s location outside the moments when the
QR code is scanned.21 Although it is possible to pinpoint users’
location from an immunity passport that does not connect to GPS
by matching it to a scanning device with known location, the risk is
lower in the second case with no cost to functionality.22
C.

Sources of Immunity

The third and potentially most important distinction is what
sources of information about immunity these passports certify. An
immunity passport can report information on: (a) who was
vaccinated; (b) who had a recent negative PCR test (which detects
18. Matthew Comb, Many vaccine passports have security flaws – here’s how to make
them safer, CONVERSATION (Dec. 1, 2021), https://theconversation.com/many-vaccinepassports-have-security-flaws-heres-how-to-make-them-safer-172556 (“[T]he contents
of the certificate are not encrypted, so anyone with access to the barcode (and the
necessary skills) can decode it and retrieve the personal information contained within.”).
19. European Consortium Develops Blockchain COVID-19 Immunity Passport, LEDGER
INSIGHTS (Feb. 2021), https://www.ledgerinsights.com/european-consortium-developsblockchain-covid-19-immunity-passport/ [https://perma.cc/7JXD-4CKE].
DATA
&
A.
I.
AUTH.,
20. Tawakkalna
Privacy
Policy,
SAUDI
https://ta.sdaia.gov.sa/en/privacy-en [https://perma.cc/FL8D-YED9] (last visited Jan.
26, 2022).
21. Georgios Karopoulos et al., A Survey on Digital Certificates Approaches for the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 9 IEEE ACCESS 138003, 138019 (2021).
22. Ignacio Cofone, Immunity Passports and Contact Tracing Surveillance, 24 STAN.
TECH. L. REV. 176, 190-91 (2021).
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the presence of the virus’ genetic material) and is thus unlikely to
be infected; (c) who tested negative in a recent rapid diagnostic
antigen test (which detects proteins that exist on the surface of the
coronavirus) and is also thus unlikely to be infected; (d) who tested
positive on a PCR test and subsequently recovered and is thus
likely to be protected; or even (e) who was shown to have
antibodies in a serology test (a blood test to detect immune
response to the virus) and is also thus likely to be protected.
Immunity passports around the world accept different
sources of information about immunity. The most common are
vaccine passports. From the apps discussed above, for example,
those from Bahrain, Brunei, Quebec, and Saudi Arabia are based on
vaccine data only. But the Danish app recognizes vaccines and
negative PCR results—and was initially designed to recognize
proof of antibodies, although this feature has not been
implemented.23 The EU Digital Covid Certificate recognizes vaccine
status and recent PCR results (positive or negative), thus also
providing information of recent negative status and COVID-19
recovery.24
As discussed in the next section, the choice about which data
to use is highly consequential for equality.
III. PASSPORT ERRORS AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY
A.

Types of Passport Errors

When evaluating errors, one must distinguish between two
types: false positive and false negatives. In immunity passports, a
false positive is an error indicating that someone is protected
against COVID-19 when in fact they are not—mistakenly or falsely
answering “yes” to the question “is this person protected?” A false
negative is an error indicating that someone is not protected
against COVID-19 when they are in fact protected—mistakenly
answering “no” to the question about whether they have

23. The
CoronaPass
App
FAQ,
CORONASMITTE
(Jan.
16,
2021),
https://en.coronasmitte.dk/faq-about-covid-19/the-corona-passport-app
[https://perma.cc/3RXN-DH8D].
24. Questions and Answers - Digital COVID Certificate, EUROPEAN COMM’N (June 1,
2021),
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/QANDA_21_2781
[https://perma.cc/CHZ7-J94T].
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protection.25 Distinguishing these two types of errors is important
because they have different social costs.
In vaccine passports (immunity passports that only log
vaccines as a source of immunity), these errors are relatively rare
because vaccine error rates are rare.26 A false negative would be
created when someone who is protected does not log their
immunity status into the app, so the app says they are not
immunized when in fact they are. This is unlikely to occur because
logging immunity is the point of downloading the app. Someone
who is unknowingly protected, for example by having recovered
from an asymptomatic infection recently, also creates a false
negative because the app will not be able to certify the fact that
they are protected.
False positives are even less varied than false negatives in
vaccine passports. False positives occur when a vaccine fails to
immunize an individual—an infrequent event after a second or
third dose.27 So, the app shows the individual as immunized when
scanned (because they received the vaccine) but they in fact are
not (because the vaccine failed to produce antibodies).
Governments can and sometimes do widen the scope of
immunity passports, for example to include PCR results, and this
choice affects errors. While lack of immunization from a vaccine is
rare,28 tests are more accurate at detecting the virus than they are
at guaranteeing that the virus is absent. Rapid antigen tests, in
particular, have a high error rate when the individual is
asymptomatic.29 False positive results in those types of apps occur
25. These definitions of error exist irrespective of whether anything in the passport
was done incorrectly or wrongly. They depend only on the disconnect between reality and
what the passport reflects.
26. Peter Doshi, Pfizer and Moderna’s “95% Effective” Vaccines – Let’s be Cautious and
OPINION
(Nov.
26,
2020),
First
See
the
Full
Data,
BMJ
https://blogs.bmj.com/bmj/2020/11/26/peter-doshi-pfizer-and-modernas-95effective-vaccines-lets-be-cautious-and-first-see-the-full-data/ [https://perma.cc/W7X8QJPL].
27. Clara Munro, Covid-19: 40% of Patients with Weakened Immune System Mount
Lower
Response
to
Vaccines,
374
BMJ
2098
(2021),
https://www.bmj.com/content/374/bmj.n2098
[https://perma.cc/4ET8-PWXT]
(explaining that this can happen for people with particular medical conditions).
28. Marc Lipsitch & Natalie E. Dean, Understanding COVID-19 Vaccine Efficacy, 370
SCIENCE 763 (2020).
29. Zishan K. Siddiqui et al., Implementation and Accuracy of BinaxNOW Rapid Antigen
COVID-19 Test in Asymptomatic and Symptomatic Populations in a High-Volume SelfReferred Testing Site, 9 AM. SOC. FOR MICROBIOLOGY 01008 (2021).
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more frequently in two scenarios. First, there is test error: a PCR
or antigen test can falsely indicate that the individual is not
infected and a blood test can falsely indicate that the individual has
the requisite antibodies, for instance because the sample was
collected improperly. Second, there are time effects: PCR tests can
only detect the virus after a day since infection, so the results might
mistakenly indicate that a person is not infected if an infection
happened very recently; and a serology test could positively
indicate antibodies when they had in fact subsequently worn off.30
B.

Consequences of Errors

False positives in terms of immunity certification lead people
who are not protected, and those around them, to erroneously
think that they are. This may lead people to: engage in activities
that they should not engage in, such as attending a restaurant;
pursue behavior that they would otherwise not, such as seeing
friends in close environments without a mask; or to not quarantine
when they should, such as after arriving from international travel,
allowing the virus to propagate. An app with many false positives
could indeed be worse than no app at all.31
False negatives, on the other hand, have a detrimental effect
on people’s mental health by having them isolate and take
unnecessary measures, which include corollaries of a lockdown
such as increased domestic violence and lockdowns’ perverse
distributional effects.32 They also have a detrimental effect in the
economy by reducing the number of people that participate in
social and commercial activities. At a macro level, they may delay
lifting economically costly measures such as shutdowns and

30. See Alexandra L. Phelan, COVID-19 Immunity Passports and Vaccination
Certificates: Scientific, Equitable, and Legal Challenges, 395 LANCET 1595, 1597 (2020).
31. Coronavirus (COVID-19) Scaling Up Our Testing Programmes, U.K. DEP’T OF HEALTH
&
SOC.
CARE
(Apr.
4,
2020)
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachm
ent_data/file/878121/coronavirus-covid-19-testing-strategy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/59AU-EUXE].
32. Lisa Austin et al., Test, Trace, and Isolate: Covid-19 and the Canadian Constitution
12
(May
22,
2020)
(Rsch.
Paper),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3608823
[https://perma.cc/CVJ4-QKZD].
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curfews, such as the one in place in Quebec from December 2021
to February 2022.33
Deciding who should qualify for immunity passports is a
question of balancing false positives and false negatives. False
positives are, on average, more socially costly than false negatives,
which allow the disease to spread as people believe they are
immune when they are not.34 Immunity passports should therefore
seek to minimize the risk of false positives with less concern for—
but not completely overlooking—false negatives. One way to do so
is having them rely exclusively on vaccine data—as opposed to
individuals’ testing history.
C.

How Error Distribution Affects Inequality

Algorithmic error is rarely distributed evenly,35 which is likely
to disproportionately harm vulnerable people in two discrete
ways.
The known harms of oversurveillance may make exclusion
from an immunity passport system sound desirable, but it is not.
Low accuracy may mean that excluded groups disproportionately
suffer from the side effects of uneven surveillance. Errors
produced by uneven surveillance exclude people from access to
services, increasing social inequality by often falling on the most
vulnerable.36 Groups with precarious living conditions, such as the
elderly living in care facilities or homeless people are also less
likely to own a smartphone that is compatible with these apps if a
printed option is unavailable.37 In places where immunity
passports are used domestically, vulnerable groups without access
to the technology or subjected to reduced accuracy are unduly
excluded from broader societal and commercial participation.38

33. Press Release, Government of Quebec, COVID-19 Pandemic - Additional Measures
Will
Come
Into
Force
Tomorrow
(Dec.
30,
2021),
https://www.quebec.ca/en/news/actualites/detail/covid-19-pandemic-additionalmeasures-will-come-into-force-tomorrow-37242 [https://perma.cc/B48Z-633C].
34. Rebecca C.H. Brown et al., Passport to Freedom? Immunity Passports for COVID19, 46 J. MED. ETHICS 652 (2020).
35. Ignacio N. Cofone, Algorithmic Discrimination Is an Information Problem, 70
HASTINGS L.J. 1389, 1406 (2019).
36. Cofone, supra note 23, at 219-21.
37. Id. at 222-23.
38. Id. 219-21 (discussing false negatives).
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This issue leads to a tension that has been pointed out for
other technologies, whereby being excluded from a technology and
its surveillance leads to harmful lower accuracy for some groups.39
This problem is similar to the one that racialized individuals
experience with facial recognition: they are identified with less
accuracy than non-racialized individuals, which creates difficulties
at workplaces that rely on facial recognition and increases the risk
of wrongful arrest.40 With less access to testing, vaccines, and
smartphones, vulnerable groups that receive less surveillance
from immunity passports, similarly, are more likely to suffer from
the apps’ side effects in terms of individually costly false negatives.
IV. INTENDED PURPOSES AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY
A.

How Passports’ Intended Purpose Affects Inequality

Immunity passports, to some extent, worsen existing
inequalities even if we assumed the error rate was zero. The
history of a previous epidemic in the United States—the yellow
fever, which ebbed and flowed from 1793-1905—provides an
insightful precedent. During much of the nineteenth century,
people in Louisiana were divided between those who had
recovered from the fever (called “acclimated”) and those who had
not (called “unacclimated”).41 The acclimated carried an immunity
certification and the unacclimated were restricted from work,
living in certain neighborhoods, and marrying.42 Immunity became
a privilege that divided citizens along race and class.43
The passports’ purpose, like immunity certification during the
yellow fever epidemics, is to give those who are certified as

39. Clare Garvie & Jonathan Frankle, Facial-Recognition Software Might Have a Racial
(Apr.
7,
2016),
Bias
Problem,
ATLANTIC
https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/04/the-underlying-bias-offacial-recognition-systems/476991/ [https://perma.cc/FC4W-DLL6].
40. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, The Inconsentability of Facial Surveillance, 66
LOY. L. REV. 101 (2020).
41. Kathryn Olivarius, Immunity, Capital, and Power in Antebellum New Orleans, 124
AM. HIST. REV. 425, 425-455 (2019).
42. Id.
43. Natalie Kofler & Françoise Baylis, Comment, Ten Reasons Why Immunity
Passports are a Bad Idea, 581 NATURE 379 (2020).

632

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 45:4

immune certain benefits that are otherwise unavailable to others,
such as going to stores, restaurants, or events.44
This generates two added layers of privilege.45 The first layer
relates to excluding vulnerable people who are less likely to own a
smartphone that can support immunity passports. Providing
people with a non-digital alternative, such as a card with a QR code
for scanning, reduces this problem—although if people have to use
technology to get the non-digital QR code, the problem persists.46
Another layer of privilege comes into play if the passports
recognize PCR or antigen test results—and if social activities are
made conditional on them. This certification method only exists for
those who have access to verified testing: free testing is
unavailable to many across the globe, so incorporating testing data
into the passport means giving more options to engage in social
and economic activities to those who can afford private testing
than those afforded to those who cannot.
Immunity passports used to police international transit
introduce the same two layers of privilege at a smaller scale. They
negatively affect immigrants and refugees, as well as those from
developing countries that have not received sufficient vaccines to
immunize, and thus certify, their citizens47—many of which will
not do so for years to come.48 In short, their introduced inequality
44. Daniel Weinstock & Vardit Ravitsky, Should Immunity Licences Be an Ingredient
in Our Policy Response to COVID-19?, in VULNERABLE: THE LAW, POLICY AND ETHICS OF COVID19 277, 277-82 (Colleen M. Flood et al. eds., 2020).
45. Iñigo de Miguel Beriain & Jon Rueda, Immunity Passports, Fundamental Rights and
Public Health Hazards: A Reply to Brown et al., 46 J. MED. ETHICS 660, 660-61 (2020); Natalie
Kofler & Françoise Baylis, Immunity Passports – Reopening the Economy and Repackaging
Racism, J. MED. ETHICS BLOG (July 1, 2020), https://blogs.bmj.com/medicalethics/2020/07/01/immunity-passports-reopening-the-economy-and-repackagingracism/ [ https://perma.cc/YNA3-YV5A].
46. This is the case under some systems like the Quebec VaxiCode which, in addition
to the app, provide a PDF option to print the QR code on paper, but people still need access
to a computer or phone to find the website and fill the appropriate forms, and to a printer.
Paper options (versus a plasticized card that can double as an ID) also deteriorate with
time.
See
Showing
Your
Vaccine
Passport,
GOVERNMENT OF QUEBEC,
https://www.quebec.ca/en/health/health-issues/a-z/2019-coronavirus/progress-ofthe-covid-19-vaccination/covid-19-vaccination-passport/showing-your-vaccinepassport#c117055 [https://perma.cc/R4LC-GZMS].
47. Luca Li Bassi, Allocating COVID-19 Vaccines Globally: An Urgent Need, JAMA
HEALTH FORUM (Feb. 8, 2021), https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama-healthforum/fullarticle/2776409 [https://perma.cc/TRG6-3ZJ5].
48. See Ana Santos Rutschman, The COVID-19 Vaccine Race: Intellectual Property,
Collaboration(s), Nationalism and Misinformation, 64 WASH. U. J. L. & POL’Y 167 (2021);
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is borne by the poor, similarly to yellow fever passports still used
in parts of Africa and South America.49
Depending on what kind of data immunity passports are
based on, three broad models affect the extent to which they
extend systemic inequality. The next section explores these
models.
B.

Mitigating Surveillance Risk

The first and most common passport model is vaccine
passports: immunity passports that only recognize vaccination
data. This type of app mirrors inequality caused by asymmetrical
vaccine distribution. It does not increase inequality significantly as
long as the socio-economic factors for people to have access to
vaccines are present—such as no-cost access to vaccines and
broader resources like information, transport, and availability.50
This equity risk reflects patterns of medical discrimination where,
for example, racialized individuals are less likely to receive
vaccines.51 Lower vaccination rates experienced by racialized
groups therefore lead to lower distribution of immunity passports,
further exacerbating marginalization and exclusion from social
and commercial activities.
The second (and second most common) alternative is
adopting immunity passports that, in addition to vaccine data, also
accept data from testing to identify both who is protected against
infection and who is shown not to be infected. Malaysia’s
Immunitee, for example, adopts this model, accepting data from
Sam Halabi & Ana Santos Rutschman, Viral Sovereignty, Vaccine Diplomacy, and Vaccine
Nationalism: The Institutions of Global Vaccine Access, EMORY INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming).
49. Mark D. Gershman & J. Erin Staples, Yellow Book - Travel-Related Infectious
Diseases - Yellow Fever, CENTER FOR DISEASE CONTROL (Apr. 9, 2021),
https://wwwnc.cdc.gov/travel/yellowbook/2020/travel-related-infectiousdiseases/yellow-fever [https://perma.cc/22UV-TRW9].
50. See generally Vaughn Barry et al., Patterns in COVID-19 Vaccination Coverage, by
Social Vulnerability and Urbanicity — United States, December 14, 2020–May 1, 2021, 70
&
MORTALITY
WKLY.
REP.
818
(June
4,
2021)
MORBIDITY
https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/volumes/70/wr/mm7022e1.htm
[https://perma.cc/83U4-R49W].
51. April Dembosky, It’s Not Tuskegee. Current Medical Racism Fuels Black Americans’
TIMES
(Mar.
25,
2021)
Vaccine
Hesitancy,
L.A.
https://www.latimes.com/science/story/2021-03-25/current-medical-racism-nottuskegee-expls-vaccine-hesitancy-among-black-americans
[https://perma.cc/5U8NP8Q7].
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vaccines, negative PCR tests, and antigen tests (so-called rapid
tests). In terms of inequality, this model is a middle-ground
between the two previous alternatives. If governments provide
free access to PCR testing, however, then they avoid the layer of
inequality produced by access to privatized medicine.
The third and least common alternative is a passport that logs
data on vaccine status and antibodies data to provide a more
complete picture of who is protected against infection. This can be
done either through serology tests, which detect antibody
responses to COVID-19 (uncommon), or through a positive PCR
test showing that one was infected with the virus and recovered
(more common). Incorporating serology tests renders the
passport more useful for individuals who can afford private
testing. This builds on inequitable access to antibody testing, and
also raises accuracy concerns.52 It is the most problematic option
from an equality perspective.
In a worst-case scenario, incorporating recovery data may
create perverse incentives for some people without access to
private testing, who might resort to infecting themselves in the
hopes of developing a certified immunity.53 For example, if
someone cannot afford a private PCR test with a result within 72
hours needed to travel, she might instead choose to become
infected to obtain a free government PCR (positive) test and then
show recovery.
This problem occurred during the HIV epidemic, when there
are records of individuals who sought infection to, among other
reasons, release themselves from fear and from the restrictions of
avoiding the virus—a tax on interpersonal relationships among
queer people before knowledge of how the virus spreads and
widespread available prophylaxis.54 Some fear that making social
participation conditional on surveillance methods for COVID-19

52. Alexandra L. Phelan, COVID-19 Immunity Passports and Vaccination Certificates:
Scientific, Equitable, and Legal Challenges, 395 LANCET 1595, 1596 (2020).
53. Kenneth Roth & Annie Sparrow, Should People Without Coronavirus Antibodies Be
TIMES
(Apr.
28,
2020),
Second-Class
Citizens?,
N.Y.
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/28/opinion/coronavirus-antibody-certificatetesting.html [https://perma.cc/9HCF-EVEV].
54. Lynda J. Ames et al., Love, Lust, and Fear: Safer Sex Decision Making Among Gay
Men, 30 J. HOMOSEXUALITY 53, 70 (1995) (discussing “bugchasers”).
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may encourage similar behavior.55 The EU Digital Covid Certificate
produces this problem by providing certificates to people who
have recovered from COVID-19, in addition to incorporating
vaccine and PCR data.56 Countries that, besides the structure of
their immunity passport (or lack thereof) accept an older positive
PCR test as alternative to a recent negative PCR test as a condition
for entry, as the United States does, produce this problem as well.
V. CHOOSING THE LEAST RESTRICTIVE INTERVENTION
The “least restrictive intervention” is a cornerstone principle
of public health ethics.57 It means that any measure restricting
rights or freedoms should only be used after having considered
less restrictive alternatives.58
Ultimately, identifying the least restrictive intervention
informs evaluations of proportionality.59 A public health
emergency should not justify suspending people’s rights when
doing so is either unnecessary or disproportionate to the public
health benefits.60 Accordingly, data protection authorities across
the world have emphasized that governments should apply the
principle of proportionality to any containment measures that may
impact people’s privacy.61
Evaluating proportionality requires determining what rights
or interests must be balanced. Here, the tradeoff is not, as often

55. Teck Chuan Voo et al., Ethical Implementation of Immunity Passports During the
COVID-19 Pandemic, 222 J. INFECTIOUS DIS. 715 (2020); Julien Nguyen Dang, United States:
Do “Covid-19 Parties”, Intended to Voluntarily Transmit the Virus, Really Exist?, FRANCEINFO
(July 5, 2020).
56. Press Release, European Commission, Coronavirus: Commission Proposes a
Digital
Green
Certificate
(Mar.
17,
2021)
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1181
[https://perma.cc/JT8F-22S9].
57. James Childress et al., Public Health Ethics: Mapping the Terrain, 30 J. L. MED &
ETHICS 170 (2002).
58. R.E.G. Upshur, Principles for the Justification of Public Health Intervention, 93 CAN.
J. PUB HEALTH, 101 (2002).
59. Nancy E. Kass, An Ethics Framework for Public Health, 91 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1776
(2001).
60. Gilad Abiri & Sebastian Guidi, The Pandemic Constitution, COL. J. TRANS. L. 68
(2021).
61. Commissioner Issues Guidance on Privacy and the COVID-19 Outbreak, OFF. OF THE
PRIVACY COMM’R OF CANADA (Mar. 20, 2020), https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/for-federalinstitutions/privacy-act-bulletins/pab_20200320/ [https://perma.cc/BN9V-2PT4].
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claimed, between privacy and public health.62 Rather, it is between
privacy and the measures for containment that would otherwise
be taken. More concretely, it is between the costs of surveillance
(in terms of inequality and privacy) against the economic and
psychological costs of a lockdown63—in other words, the human
right risks of particular surveillance against the benefits of
avoiding lockdown measures. The question is not whether to
protect public health, but rather how to do so: by opening
businesses and leveraging surveillance to allow people to
participate in commercial or social activities, or by closing
businesses and keeping people in their homes for longer.64 Such a
choice is not categorical (with either everything open and a
maximally invasive immunity passport or a complete lockdown
with no measure of digital containment), but rather exists in the
margins of every containment choice regarding what activities are
kept open and how to certify immunity of those who partake in
them.
We must also consider the duration of surveillance measures
and their staying power once the pandemic subsides. COVID-19
surveillance infrastructure should not be used to engage in
location or proximity surveillance after the pandemic without a
separate analysis as to whether doing so is justified. Once
surveillance is implemented, it rarely fades. It is imperative to
ensure that apps’ surveillance will sunset once the pandemic is
under control. Establishing a clear termination condition in
advance is essential to this end. As of today, however, no
governments have provided such guarantee. For example, the
European Union announced that it will suspend the EU Digital
Covid Certificate when the World Health Organization considers
the pandemic to be over, but added that the system could be

62. Karen Hao, Coronavirus is Forcing a Trade-Off Between Privacy and Public Health,
TECH.
REV
(Mar.
24,
2020),
MIT
https://www.technologyreview.com/2020/03/24/950361/coronavirus-is-forcing-atrade-off-between-privacy-and-public-health/ [https://perma.cc/XP9C-WN9B].
63. See Mason Marks, Controlled Substance Regulation for the COVID-19 Mental
Health Crisis, 72 ADMIN. L. REV. 649 (2020); Fauzi Budi Satria et al., Can Digital Vaccine
Passports Potentially Bring Life Back to “True-Normal”?, 1 COMPUT. METHODS & PROGRAMS IN
BIOMEDICINE 100011 (2021).
64. Ciro Cattuto & Alessandro Spina, The Institutionalisation of Digital Public Health:
Lessons Learned from the COVID-19 App, 228 EUR. J. RISK REG. 233 (2020).
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reactivated if a similar public health emergency arises.65 And even
if governments do guarantee that the system will be disbanded
permanently once the COVID-19 pandemic ends, there is
precedent to take such promise with a grain of salt. Promises that
surveillance responding to a concrete crisis will be phased out once
the crisis is over are often empty.66
If proportionality is the aim, apps should minimize data
retention by working on a decentralized system. They should only
collect the data they need to function, have clear data retention
periods, and avoid continuous tracking.
Applying these principles to immunity passports’ design and
rollout is essential. Advocates argue that the benefit of
implementing immunity passports is proportional to their
introduced risks. The argument is that immunity passports have,
compared to the baseline of a lockdown, fewer restrictions for
some individuals (those who can use them to prove vaccination),
even if not for everyone, being therefore less restrictive than the
counterfactual lockdown.67 On the other hand, critics contend that
immunity passports fail the test of the least restrictive intervention
with regards to equality even if all above-mentioned proposals
were implemented.68
The takeaway is that a proportionality exercise that considers
the principle of least restrictive intervention does not categorically
reject data-driven technology to aid in containment. It rather
examines how apps can assist public health in containing the
pandemic while minimizing the harms that the ensuing
surveillance produces. Immunity passports should be based on
vaccine data, should be implemented only in places where vaccines
are widely available to the population and distributed for free,
65. Press Release, European Commission, Coronavirus: Commission Proposes a
Digital
Green
Certificate
(Mar.
17,
2021)
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1181
[https://perma.cc/VXN3-TNUF].
66. Casey Ross, After 9/11, We Gave Up Privacy for Security. Will We Make the Same
TradeOff
After
Covid-19?,
STAT
(Apr.
8,
2020),
https://www.statnews.com/2020/04/08/coronavirus-will-we-give-up-privacy-forsecurity/ [https://perma.cc/5ZJ6-FWC6].
67. Govind Persad & Ezekiel J. Emanuel, The Ethics of COVID-19 Immunity-Based
Licenses (‘Immunity Passports’), 323 JAMA 2241 (2020); Kevin Cope et al., Vaccine
Passports as a Constitutional Right, ARIZONA STATE L. J. (forthcoming 2022).
68. Daniel Weinstock, A Harm Reduction Approach to Physical Distancing, IN THE
ETHICS OF PANDEMICS (Meredith Celene Schwartz ed., 2020).
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should track location only at the moment it is scanned, and should
provide a paper option.
VI. CONCLUSION
Immunity passports present benefits for curbing the
pandemic’s spread. But they also introduce surveillance risks that
we must consider—both at a policy and at an individual level. The
appropriate response is to identify and mitigate these risks.
This Essay explores how to do so. It identifies interrelated
risks that immunity passports create due to their type of
surveillance and its distribution. It discusses how different
versions of apps create or avoid each of these risks, providing a
roadmap for policymakers to choose among different types of apps
and mitigate their unintended consequences. Legislators and
judges should take measures to curb these risks. Although most
concrete recommendations will be contextual, apps should work
on a decentralized system. They should use the least invasive data
possible, and they should have clear sunset clauses for both the app
and collected data.
Crucially, immunity passports should be based on vaccine
data, should be implemented only where vaccines are widely
available to the population, and should track location only at the
moment they are scanned. Governments should provide them in
both app and hard-copy form.

